

The University of Chicago

A CRITICAL SURVEY OF
SOME RECENT THEORIES OF THE
ORIGIN AND NATURE OF RELIGION

A PART OF A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE
HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE RELIGION

1932

By

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

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The effort to define religion and get at its origins has had a most irregular course. The problem of procuring a satisfactory method not only for dealing with the many-sided data, but, indeed, for delimiting the field of inquiry so as to arrive at some sort of an agreement as to what constitutes the material of a science of religion, has been attacked from so many angles that it is not astonishing to find a great divergence of opinion. Theory after theory and method after method dealing with some phase of the problem as a whole were found to be inadequate were abandoned, revived, and abandoned again. Each new methodological approach in one science or another which in any way affected religion found an echo in the work of religious scientists. Each new philosophical or metaphysical theory was reflected in religious theory. The task of achieving a method which is free, also, from the host of unscientific impediments has been so difficult that often the efforts were discouraging.

The early assurance with which Tylor set about his task of achieving a science of culture having as firm a footing as the natural sciences at that time apparently possessed, seemed to be quite warranted also in the task of building a systematic science of religion. However, while there is no cause for despair, it may be reasonably affirmed that the foundations of the science of religion are still in the making; the disagreement as to what the cornerstone of that science is to be is so sharp as to suggest the greatest care in advancing conclusions.

I

Three aspects of the theory and approach of Tylor became fundamental to the study of religion almost down to the end of the century. They were Tylor's faith in evolution, his effort to find a basis virtually as axiomatic for the science of culture and religion as was the mathematical basis for the natural sciences, and, lastly, an intellectualism which made him define religion in terms of belief and assume a "psychological unity" of the race which would give support to the theory of evolution

¹The following constitutes the final chapter of a Doctoral Dissertation submitted to the University of Chicago.

according to fixed laws.

To Tylor's Animism with its evolutionary culmination in high theism, Max Müller added the idea of a "faculty of faith" which later theorists variously designated as a religious "instinct" or "sentiment" or "predisposition," and the further idea of the importance of the external world of nature as that factor which brings forth the religious response. Though Tylor sought explicitly to get away from "transcendental Philosophy and Theology" and ground his theory much as the theory of biological evolution was grounded, the austere and rigidly selective procedure by which he guaranteed the simplicity of his system, was soon overlaid with a warm current of thought coming from Christian Theism, particularly from Schleiermacher, with its emphasis on feeling and its tendency to look not only to the "lower" end of the evolutionary scale but rather to the "upper" end, so that in theorists like Reville and Pfleiderer religion became belief in the divine Mind and man's relationship with this Mind. In a vague way the social nature of religion was stressed, its relatedness to human life and its human setting—particularly by A. Reville—but in the main the emphasis continued to be placed on the relationship, partly of feeling but essentially of belief, with the supernatural beings whose outline and function, though only partially investigated, seemed nevertheless to be fairly clear and therefore easily assignable to convenient categories. Magic was no real problem for the early theorists, being simply a manifestation of false logic applied to supernatural beings just as religious evolution culminating in the high-god was a manifestation of true logic.

These in general were the central ideas of the theorists of the early part of the first period. The comparative and the anthropological methods seemed to function quite adequately until the beginning of the last decade of the Nineteenth Century, when theories and methods began to be reexamined. With a serious questioning of these methods a new impetus was given to the psychological method and the new historical method, but these two new methods were not used together, except in a very few cases. The American anthropologists used the historical method so exclusively that an extensive catalogue of facts was built up, but these facts remained long unrelated to theories of the nature of religion or to psychological theories in general. On the other hand the psychological investigations as to the origin and nature of religious phenomena could be only very imperfectly supported by accurately sifted historical facts. Thus it was possible for such a system as that of Durkheim's to be most insecurely grounded in ethnological data, a grounding which it

absolutely needed to hold it erect. With the breakdown of Animism and the old anthropological method there again arose the need for justifying basic methods and results simultaneously.

The problem became acute, however, when it was seen that no single science could determine the origin or the nature of religion. Each science could present only a restricted number of phenomena and endeavor to formulate the laws which govern those phenomena. Wherever the limits of the sciences were extended to overcome the restrictions set in dealing with the data a conflict of method followed which, as in the case of the völk-erpsychologische Methode, did not always throw the expected light on the nature of religion. While it was seen that a combination of various sciences was probably necessary for disclosing the nature of religion, the full implications of this was not then and is certainly not even now clear. The simple effort to place the differentium of religion in one of the three general phases of man's future—the conative, the emotional, and the intellectual—continued. There were those who still felt that the essence of religion lay in the intellectualistic aspect of man's nature. Wundt sought it in the process by which the contents of the fantasizing and theoretical consciousness underwent change through the pressure of a practical situation and were made over into the contents of the practical reason. The American Functionalists reversed this and found the urge of man toward the fundamental necessities of life to be the soil and the substance of the later differentiated valuating consciousness, developed as a function of group life and basic in the contents of all religious ideas. The idea of the religious sentiment, attacked from all sides, suffered an eclipse until Rudolph Otto once more revived it in his systematic analysis of the religious feeling, the existence of which he boldly affirmed. Alongside of these efforts was Pater Schmidt's theory of an exclusive primitive monotheism with its correlative theory of an exclusive primitive pure response of man to the Supreme Being.

In all these theories it was assumed the object of religion was the supernatural. While Durkheim's theory identified the supernatural and the spirit of the group, his whole work centered around the effort to show how the supernatural came to be. The American Functionalists on the other hand related the object of religion with the values of the group, interpreting the supernatural in terms of those values. However, although this brought religion to earth, there still remained a residue of a specific sort of psychological functioning which had a development of its own. The social supernatural in this differentiated social religious consciousness still had many qualities

of the old supernatural.

The early theories were all efforts to relate properly the elements of the supernatural to each other and to the factors entering into man's response to the supernatural. Under the continual pressure applied by the naturalistic psychologists who demanded a proof of the supernatural and of the social scientists who gradually felt also that the assumption of the supernatural might after all be too facile a solution to the problem of the nature of religion, the new non-supernaturalistic theories grew up. The deciding turn in religious theory came when the question was asked as to the ultimate nature of the self-realization and values which man seeks and how these are related to individual and group life. When this question was finally asked the lines of theory once more became realistic. Up to then they had threatened to become more and more arbitrary. This was probably best exemplified in the theory of Andrew Lang, despite his checks on the anthropological method and his researches into abnormal psychology, and even more so in the theory of the early Girgensohn, who, working largely with Wundt's psychology, firmly contended that though there is a drive toward self-realization bordering on the daemonic, there is no religion without a "relationship" with the "divine power," and therefore he rejected the Taoism of Lao Tse, early Buddhism and Confucianism as not being religious. There is to be sure, he contended, a quale but the salvation of religion comes without being sought. This note of Girgensohn's, struck in 1903, has been reëchoed in German theory and is really fundamental to most of the major German theories of today.

The same problem was latent in the position of Marett but it was never brought to a sharp focus. Marett's analysis of magic and religion, spell and prayer, mana and tabu, turned about the problem of the source of value. However, Marett tended to interpret the supernatural in purely ontological terms, which virtually meant naturalistic terms. Nevertheless he wavered at all crucial points and let his naturalism blur out into a supernaturalism. Religion became an attitude of "awe," a sort of apprehension of an object with a value content. His social interpretation likewise wavered between naturalistic social sanction, a social creation of the sacred, and a counter theory with an individual basis, stressing intuitional apprehension of the supernatural object.

II

The above problem has become almost the pivot around which contemporary theory regarding the nature of religion moves. Does the nature of religion center finally in man's search for values

and satisfactions and the means of achieving these satisfactions or does it reside in a value experience which comes to him as he faces his world with its life situations? Stated thus the problem might be regarded as meaningless and indeed it must be added that involved in the latter half of the problem is the reality of the supernatural.

Disregarding Pater Schmidt's theory of an exclusive monotheism which has been rejected as logically acceptable but "unproven," the problem regarding the nature of the supernatural is twofold: (1) it must be shown that the supernatural exists as an independent qualitatively distinct factor throughout the history of religions; (2) that this factor is central in religions. In opposition to this, it must be shown that the drive for values and satisfactions of desires thoroughly accounts for all the phenomena of religion.

We considered first the phenomenological school of Beth, Otto, Hauer, and Heiler. In them we have a distinct carrying forward of the problem as left by Marett to the reassertion of the distinctiveness of the religious object which is affirmed to have a unique value content. The object of religion is, to use Otto's oft quoted term, used by all of the above writers, das ganz Andere. Corresponding to the uniqueness of the object there is a unique type of response. In Otto this is definitely affirmed and analyzed as a separate, independent, unique functioning of consciousness, while in Hauer it is a "sort of instinct." In Beth we find it rests on a pre-historical differentiation of man's attitude which has as its principle characteristic the submissiveness to the supersensual object. In Hauer this response is, however, a response of "the whole person." Heiler more closely qualifies the object and affirms that religion emerges only then when there is a "personal" response to a personal God, who arises when the idea of the high-god and mana converge.

From the above theories it may be gleaned how the problem of Girgensohn has been brought to a focus and elaborate solutions offered. The chief criticism that these writers make of Marett is that he failed to see that the supernatural is a unique object of value and that the "awe" felt before the supernatural is a unique value experience. In all of these writers with the exception of Hauer there is an arbitrary methodological division between religion and pre-religion. In this way the problem of the centrality of the human drive for satisfactions in religion is circumvented and instead there is offered a doctrine of the structure of religious experience when it appears. Hauer drove his psychological analysis farther back into the problem of how primitive man seeks to absolutise himself in the struggle for

existence and how the religious experience of the "wholly other" even at the dawn of things provides man with a sense of absolute worth and an early awareness of the sacred and profane.

The weakness of both the methods and results achieved by the above writers makes it impossible to accept their conclusions for the science of religion. The first valid question to ask is whether they have succeeded, where Max Müller and his successors failed, in the uncovering of a unique compartment of the mind, which may be called the religious predisposition.

There are two possible methods for a science of religion; one is to follow out the sciences of history, ethnology, psychology and sociology, permitting each to seek its own bases and checking one with the other. The other is to employ a metaphysical method which will provide so adequate a demonstration that the conclusions can be legitimately forced upon the sciences as essential to their foundations. Now the forms, i.e. "predispositions" which Otto's phenomenological approach employs as basic can be validated only by recourse to a metaphysical method. In his work, however, Otto has not developed such a method and has recourse only to the highly subjective procedure of asking the reader to examine his own experience. This, however, cannot lead to objective criteria. On the other hand Otto's account of the functioning of consciousness does not always reveal a clear case of the functioning of the noumenal consciousness; what he offers can quite as easily, rightly or wrongly, be interpreted psychologically. Otto offers not one value category which does not have a naturalistic counterpart. His descriptive differentiation of the noumenous experience from ordinary psychological experience is wholly in terms of the "negative." Psychologically it may be said that Otto has not been successful in making a clear case for the existence of the noumenous consciousness, and until this is done the science of religion can regard his theory only as a logical possibility. It would then have to decide further to restrict religion to the noumenous experience, which Otto regards as the only experience worth being called religious.¹

Hauer's theory is even more tied up with man's drive for values but his theory of the "wholly other" and the unique religious experience is likewise not systematically differentiated from ordinary psychological experience.

Heiler's decision as to the nature of religion rests finally not upon psychological analysis but upon what he regards as its central phenomenon—prayer. However, Heiler's account of

¹Otto, Kant-Fries'sche Religionsphilosophie. Tübingen: Mohr (1909), 1929, pp. 196-97.

prayer in its most primitive form is precisely an account of man's drive for values, an inarticulate groping and the expression of desire. Since this does not fit Heiler's idea that religion is relationship to a personal god, he distinguishes between this primitive prayer and "pure" prayer by recourse to Otto's idea of the numinous and to the idea of "higher" and "lower," insisting that religion must ultimately be interpreted in terms of the "highest" manifestation. The science of religion, however, requires a basis for such a valuation of "higher" and "lower," but this Heiler does not offer. He merely points to religious "geniuses" and naïvely regards them as examples of the "higher." Neither does he offer any objective criteria for the acceptance of personal prayer as "pure" religion.

The application of the theological method is equally well exemplified by Beth who like Heiler sets a limit "beneath which one may not go." The basis for Beth's contention is twofold: (1) because, as he contends, the experience of the high- and the "divine" god goes down to the "lowest" historical level, and (2) because magic can be logically differentiated as the wilful self-realization of man. The historical aspect of Beth's thesis, which pictures man in a state in which these two attitudes are still undifferentiated is, like Pater Schmidt's, still unproven, while the logical aspect is very questionable.

In all of the above theories it is recognized that religion has to do with the self-realization of man, with the apprehension, securing or receiving of values. All are agreed that religion represents a special attitude and technique which relates man to the supernatural, and which is a sphere of human life separate from the sphere of ordinary existence. But if the psychological foundations have so far been only of a subjective nature and without objective elements useful to the science of religion, i.e. elements not open to general verification, the sociological, ethnological, and historical evidence is likewise unfavorable. Sociology has been no more able to work with "irreducible forms" a priori than the science of psychology for they have not been discoverable. It is more and more forced into a position of making its data behavior relations out of which it reads its "forms," and these it holds tentatively. Ethnologically these theories suffer because it has been shown that there are social situations in which the dichotomy of sacred and profane do not exist. Historically it is impossible to arrive at Otto's Vorstufe der Religion or Beth's symbiotic-sympathetic feeling stage. Heiler's dichotomy is purely logical. It is significant, however, that both Heiler and Hauer affirm that on the most primitive level man seeks only material values. In Hauer the aware-

ness of the "supernatural" may, however, be interwoven with this early quest for material values so that there is no necessary historical or logical break which would tend to give his theory an arbitrary basis. On the other hand Hauer's negative appraisal of pre-historical data pertaining to the supernatural sets an origin to religion by showing that prior to the middle paleolithic period art at least was naturalistic, giving no trace of the supernatural.

III

The effort to give Otto's theory a psychological turn was attempted by Flower who sought to show that Otto's "wholly other" could be viewed as an "utterly beyond." This wholly negative element, which when recognized becomes a factor tending to disintegrate man's actions, is recaptured by imagination and reasoning. Man reacts to this beyond in such a way that his emotions are not fully discharged. He remains partially tied up in a knot. In this way Flower distinguishes between the religious man and the conventionally religious man. It was contended that Flower's theory of the "utterly beyond" does not give the criterium of religion which he seeks, while it definitely embodies a weakness which Otto's theory does not possess. Otto contends that fear and fascination are simultaneously present in man's reaction to his environment, that value is always present throughout the frustration experience, making complete frustration impossible. The "wholly other" is precisely not the "utterly-beyond." It is very difficult to see how the process of integration can start after Flower's "reaction by withdrawal" operates. The only way it can is to assume that his reason and imagination are, like Otto's nouminous consciousness, predispositions to act. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the person whose emotions are wholly discharged in a conventionally religious situation is not a religious man—except by definition. Finally, the idea of an "utterly-beyond" cannot be rightly regarded as being psychologically discriminated; it is rather like the idea of the "sacred" a value category imposed upon the environment by man.

IV

While the phenomenologists have sought a formal basis for the nature of religion and the grounding of the supernatural and have set up formal a priori fences limiting the material to be used in the consideration of the essence of religion which in all instances presupposes the centrality of the god idea, the opposing forces are represented by those who feel that the nature of religion lies not in God, i.e. an object and its apprehension but in the non-rational drive for satisfaction, undifferentiated into unique functions.

The "pre-animists" who recognized this problem ranged themselves on both sides. Their interpretation of magic and tabu had been most intimately related to the securing of life values and social stability. From their predecessors, however, they took over the ideas of evolution and the centrality of the supernatural. The idea of evolution was progressively abandoned, but the destruction of the unitary character of the religious object by the introduction of mana and the high-god alongside of spirit made necessary a reexamination of the data to see what unity existed, if any, and how the objective factor was related to the individual and social drives for satisfaction, and whether it necessarily involved the "supernatural."

V

The ethnologists had gathered great quantities of materials and pointed out definite cultural and time relations but they did not advance far toward correlating this material for use in providing an empirical definition of religion. Goldenweiser sought to provide a method—that of "limiting concepts"—by which he hoped to show that the two fundamental concepts of the supernatural, spirit and mana, could be given a religious significance by eliminating their purely philosophical significance, leaving them as fundamental objects of feeling. Religion was therefore feeling directed toward the "supernatural." Almost a decade later Goldenweiser refused still to make a definite statement regarding the "supernatural as the high-god." The positive dynamic element in man which sought fulfillment Goldenweiser relegated to magic which he sharply differentiated from religion as the search for definite ends. Religion became a feeling of participation in the "supernatural." But Goldenweiser never clarified what he meant by the "religious thrill." Its nature was not that of a separate function of consciousness; at least no description of it was offered; nor did the religiousness of the object lie in the fact that it transcended the natural, for so did the supernatural of philosophy. Behind his theory there lurked the idea of a special religious value but this was never elaborated.

In contrast to Goldenweiser Söderblom sought to discover the element which brought the strands of the supernatural together and made it a unity. Mana and spirit were augmented by the idea of the Urheber, whose origin was reflective, and these three when convergent made up the object of religion having the specifically religious quality of the "sacred." The quality of the "sacred," however, had no subjective or subjectively social origin. Neither did Söderblom seek to place its origin in a separate department of consciousness. However, Söderblom was impressed by the fact that the drive for values and goods was quite

of a piece with, and an important element in religion, not something to be placed in a separate category and dismissed. So up to a certain point he identified magic and religion, but he sought an autonomous basis for the origin of the "sacred." This he found in an "irrational" element in man, which seemed to him to lie deeper than both the individual and social drives for definite ends in life. He sharply rejected Durkheim's position because he felt that it failed to take into account the individual nature of the "irrational" and the more than "social" nature of the "sacred." Söderblom's category of the "sacred," together with Otto's earlier category of the "supernatural," gave to the individual psychologists the specific value category which was needed for a unitary religious conception of the religious object, and his idea of the "irrational" gave the correlative subjective category which took in both the idea of response to a supernatural object and the idea of the quale of man in his drive for fulfillment.

VI

The idea of the relationship of religion to man's practical life was, as we noted, deeply embedded in pre-animism. No one had elaborated this theory more thoroughly than Preuss, who sought to trace the mental development of primitive peoples in terms of the relation of their social needs to their awareness of supernatural power, insisting that man's religion was based on these needs, though not identical with them. Preuss's study of the high-gods since his tentative conclusions appeared in Globus (1906) led him finally to the conclusion that the high-gods are not, as Söderblom contended, the result of reflection but emerge in man as the result of a mystical experience in answer to his feeling of the need of order in the world; but he agrees with those who contend that the mystical experience with respect to the high-gods is the same in quality as that relating to spirits and mana. He goes further to contend that the supernatural world is an organic unity in primitive life and is often experienced as such. It is impossible therefore to seek to understand it by analyzing its elements. One can only understand it by viewing it as a whole and by seeking to understand what produces it. Preuss's contention is that the world of the supernatural is born as an "irrational" mystical experience of faith which arises in answer to the life needs of man. Like Söderblom and Otto, Preuss makes the sharp distinction between the natural and the supernatural world and between the rational-practical and irrational-mystical techniques for achieving goals, but the ideals which Preuss suggests are always the ideals of ordinary life. Religion for Preuss is the experience of the supernatural.

The search for it, and the techniques based on its experience, "supplement" man's rational and practical technique, and his world view. Religious experience and techniques are based upon man's quest for his life values. Preuss never departs from the values of the social life though he does not identify religion with man's total social effort to achieve life values. Another aspect of Preuss's theory which dulls the sharp edge of his dichotomy between the natural and the supernatural, and the rational and irrational, is that he affirms the figures of the supernatural world to be essentially the same as man; only the means of controlling them are different from the means of controlling practical objects.

Preuss does not seek to give an analysis of what he means by mysticism or faith, and in characterizing the significance of the high-gods he shifts between saying positively that they, like all supernatural objects, are the objects of the mystical experience and that they represent as symbols the values of justice and order, implying that they are imaginative constructions. Man's felt need for universal order (not his reflection) gives birth to the high-god. The illuminative experience is caused by an inner need and not by an outer object as is the case when man has a mystical experience with the mana quality of a stone. Thus the life drive for immanent life values is, in Preuss's latest work as in his early work, still central to his thesis even though he follows Söderblom in the use of the "irrational" and the "supernatural." This fact leaves his dichotomy hanging in the air. One does not see the final need for it as an ultimate interpretive principle. The problem, which is of fundamental significance to the ultimate nature of religion—man's drive for values or the experience of an objective supernatural—remains unclarified. Preuss did, however, advance the discussion beyond Goldenweiser and Söderblom by showing the relative organic unity of the supernatural world, whatever its interpretation.

Quite in contrast to the final lack of clarity of Preuss's position is the theory of Haydon who has consistently carried through the theories of the American Functionalists to a thoroughgoing naturalistic conclusion. All the values of the life process are directly related to social life. They all grow out of the non-rational, dynamic drive for the fulfillment of man's life. None of them—and this is true also of the so-called "higher" values—requires for its explanation a positive "irrational" or special valuating principle. All of them can be stated wholly in terms of social psychology. The differentiation or "complexification" of values is interpretable altogether in terms of the practical and social needs of the group. No concepts devised

for the description of supernatural values have done more than give negative descriptions of natural social values which were already functions of the group life, and no psychological analysis has led to the demonstration of a priori forms which would permit a non-social-psychological classification of the data of the history of religion.

Haydon definitely rejects the dichotomies which have been characteristic of the theories we have examined—natural and supernatural, rational and irrational, mystical and practical—and contends that the world views, techniques and ideals of men are dictated by the natural hopes and desires of social human beings. Of central importance in this connection is his theory that the ceremonial techniques are inseparably bound up with practical techniques and goals. Preuss begins with a unique mystical experience and seeks to relate it to the "life needs" and practical ends of conduct. This he finds difficult. Consequently he has to resort to an "interpretation" of the significance of the object of the mystical experience as symbolic, in order to bring it once more into direct relation to the "life needs" which Preuss cannot cease ultimately to regard as anything but fundamental. Haydon, however, begins with "desire" as the fundamental religious concept. Since this is a psychological concept he is not forced to explain or reinterpret any heterogeneous principle such as Preuss's "mystical illumination." He did, however, have recourse to a social principle to make clear that the values of religion are not purely biological. In this sense his use of the word "practical" is perhaps vague and open to attack by those who would limit the practical to the material satisfaction of biological needs. And of course in this same sense Haydon's concept of desire is "supernatural." It is, however, quite clear that his concept is simply social-psychological and has no heterogeneous implications. The term social, moreover, can be taken back to the most primitive dawn of human intercourse and, therefore, in the differentiation of the social values which satisfy desire there is no need for introducing any levels or any categories which must be regarded as sui generis. Preuss finds it necessary finally to interpret his "mystical experience" and the high-god in terms of socially embodied human ideals or, better, human welfare. For Haydon the idea of human welfare represents from the very outset the heart of religion itself. The nature of this welfare refers to desire as related to the problems of social life, while the feeling aspect of religion is purely naturalistic, the natural release of emotion.

This leads us back to the problem of the natural and the supernatural. In Otto, and latterly in his disciple H. Frick,

the contention is that there is an historical break which marks the rise of the supernatural. Frick's contention against Preuss is that such values as goodness and righteousness have nothing to do with what Preuss calls the practical needs of man and he insists that Preuss never distinguishes clearly between those values that are practical and those which are more than practical, that is, those which are natural and those which are "supernatural." Frick insists that these latter values have nothing to do with magic and the cult of the dead as Preuss contends. They are, rather, exclusively associated with the high-god and are both "rational" and "irrational." As we have already seen Haydon's contention is that the high-gods as the high heaven powers are the sources of very practical values. Frick now draws on Westermann's distinction between the high-god and the cult of the dead and magic, the former being regarded by Westermann as having a "theoretical" origin among the Kpelle, the latter a "practical" origin. Westermann calls attention, as have Preuss, Pettazoni, and others, to the fact that the high-god does not frequently enter into the religious practices. However, Frick's contention that the high-gods are definitely separated from "magic" and the cult of the dead is not historically true. The high-god is himself frequently the source of the magical practices which he gives to men. In other words, the historical break which Frick believes he has found with respect to the values of goodness and righteousness is again only arbitrary and meaningless unless it can be shown that these are truly sui generis and not related as Haydon contends to social stability and values of a very practical though indefinite sort which the natural character of inter-individual life brings forth, and which are related to desire and the check placed on that desire by the group.

Frick, drawing on Westermann, has not essentially advanced the theory of the supernatural, for while Westermann does say that the relationship of the Kpelle to the high-god is not an "everyday" matter and is "higher," the distinction which Westermann makes is that the high-god is of a theoretical origin. Westermann makes no claim for a supernatural basis of values, only a theoretical origin of the high-god among the Kpelle. There are, however, innumerable instances of the high-god being the source of practical values and, as Preuss has shown, of being related sometimes to cult ceremonies. This, taken together with the fact that the "magical" ceremonies and "lower" supernatural beings are mythologically linked with the high-god, would make it exceedingly hazardous to suggest that religion be restricted to that aspect of the relationship with the high-god which has to do with the "high" moral values. This position like the similar position

of Schmidt's, cannot be proved historically; it can only be held logically. Frick's suggestion that beyond Pater Schmidt's "rational" and Otto's "irrational" origin of religion lies the fact that man is faced by the "living god" with his moral imperative, that the discovery of this god is a mystical discovery not to be derived from any other source, has still to meet not only Haydon's contention that the natural source of the values which the gods and the high-god represent in the social process itself, but also the contention of Preuss that the extra-human forces are related so that any distinctions made between them cannot be carried to the point of an absolute separation of the high-god from the remaining supernatural beings. The arbitrariness in Frick's division is as clear as it is in Schmidt's. Finally, if he wishes to hold to his position Frick must provide an analysis of the mystical experience which is scientifically verifiable.

Here as so often in the past the science of religion arrives at an impasse. The consistent carrying through of an interpretation in terms of desire, social welfare and social ideals on the one hand, and the affirmation of the existence of a "mystical experience" that is beyond the "rational" and the "irrational" on the other, simply leads to two wholly separate realms of discourse. The implication is that this phenomenology of religion must separate itself from the science of religion, or that the science of religion must drop it unless this phenomenology can show that there exists such a relationship absolutely free of natural hopes and needs, and free of fundamentally social implications. All that can be said is that this has not yet been done. Similarly against all dogmatic naturalistic interpretations of religion it must be said that each differentiation of experience may have laws of its own which a single generalized method beginning with the data of psychology and history cannot formulate. But this contention could be turned against the exponents of levels, for all "lower" stages, it might be held, also have their own religious character and the battle over the arbitrariness of a criterium for distinguishing religion from pre- or non-religion would then have to be fought again unless a frank admission be made that we cannot get beyond comparative dogmatics to objective criteria. In either case, however, the problem is one which falls in the realm of metaphysics.

The science of religion at present has no objective means of deciding whether there are values sui generis. It can, however, face the problem of how inclusive the word religion is to be made and it must now be obvious that the desire for values of a very practical nature, relating to man's bodily security are a part of man's religion. We dare not fail to include them in re-

ligion. Any effort to center on values which are regarded as specifically "religious" and capable of generalization as such must receive more support than it has hitherto obtained. That there are more than "material" values to be considered in defining religion few theorists would be hardy enough to deny. However, the specific origin of the non-material values is of little consequence in defining religion if it is obvious that the material values are fundamentally related to the same objects that are the source of immaterial values. A formal differentiation of values is purely logical if it can be shown concretely, as it has been, that many of primitive man's rites, naïvely directed to these objects, are prophylactic and that these rites are simply an aspect of his total fund of techniques employed in the effort at individual and social fulfillment. In short, it ought to be recognized that one part of the cross section of man's religion is not merely based upon but is identical with man's drive for material satisfaction, and that this fact cannot be neglected in seeking to place the differentium of religion. If this contention be valid then it ought to be possible not only to get beyond such dichotomies as sacred and profane, rational and irrational, but also to get definitely beyond the old differentiation of religion as something "based upon" the drive for material satisfactions from religion as being historically, at least in part, essentially identical with it.

This leads to the conclusion that any systematic view of religion will go beyond the logically isolated world views, the consideration of the ideal or ideals and techniques, and take account of the drive to fulfillment in all its aspects as an essential factor of religion, as Haydon contends. However, the tendency in Preuss and more strongly in Haydon, is to denature the world view element of its objective content and identify it with technique. This seems to me to go beyond descriptive interpretation. There is meant here no insistence upon an exclusive "super"-natural or a "super"-human element for a systematic view of religion, but only upon the integrity of the objective aspect of the world view; whether that world view involves the natural or the supernatural, the human or superhuman does not matter. Man stands in inter-relation with a natural and social environment in which, or in cooperation with which, he hopes to realize definite or indefinite values, both as an individual and as a cooperating member of a group. What values man desires, what techniques he employs, what vague or specific responses either as emotional reactions or ideas he makes depends, of course, on his own nature and the nature of his environment. What these latter in the last analysis are we cannot say. A systematic

science of religion can only come to terms with individual sciences, philosophic world views and theology, and from any present vantage point we may say this coming-to-terms will be eternally problematical.

A science of religion seeking a descriptive definition of religion can only state how striving man, with his ideals and techniques and the whole environment or certain selected inter-related aspects of it are correlated in a changing unity. This relative unity is something of which primitive man, as indeed man at all times, was certainly vaguely aware. The nature of this unity, approached subjectively, can only be stated so as to show which aspect of the great variety of possible activities or responses of man was dominant at any one time. And many aspects have at some time or other been dominant.

Finally, it is essential to keep the balance of Haydon's triad of world view, ideals, and technique unimpaired. Any effort to place the differentium of religion in one of the three instead of at an unknown moving point somewhere between the three must result in turning over the science of religion, which can only state its findings in terms of relationships, to some form of world view, or result in the exclusion or devaluation of some phase of historical or cultural material, an exclusion based upon the application of a special technique or bias in the evaluation of historical and cultural materials.

The weakness of this position has, of course, often been stated. It fails to provide religion with an "inner" meaning, an ultimate essence, and offers only a view by which the nature of religion is continually approximated. Its strength, possibly increasing as the sciences—including also the so-called normative sciences—advance in relation to each other, lies in its openness to materials which a gradually changing view makes it impossible to exclude without separating these materials into artificial categories that destroy the "living context" in which they are found.

